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This paper employs the 2020 pandemic crisis as an empirical setting to analyze how venture 
capitalists investments react under financing constraints. In particular, this paper examines how 
the amount per round received by a startup from venture capital funds is affected by the COVID-
19 outbreak and if there are particular sectors that are benefitting from the situation. The empirical 
findings show that in 2020 the average amount per round raised is higher than it was in the past 
years and that VCs have preferred to invest more money for younger new ventures belonging to 
Information Technology and Medical/Health/Life Science sectors.  
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1. Introduction 
By funding new ventures, venture capitalists (VCs) help alleviate asymmetry problems associated 
with new founded startups (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Indeed, VCs invest both their financial 
and non-financial capital addressing these market frictions by the ex-ante screening and ex post 
monitoring of companies. By overcoming these market failures, VCs make their contribution to 
employment growth, innovation and higher aggregate income (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Samila 
and Sorenson, 2010, 2011; Colombo et al., 2016).  
    Generally, there are several factors which might affect VCs investment strategies in a startup: 
the total amount of funding already received, the number of patents granted, the startup sector, the 
number of investment rounds, the geography of the new ventures, the age at financing, are all 
examples of variables which might influence the VCs investment decisions. Despite these factors, 
little is known about how VC investment model reacts under sudden and severe stress. Financial 
crises introduce shocks that alter the economic environment (Bernanke, 1983), modifying the 
conditions that support the VC investment model. The Covid-19 outbreak is leading to a triple 
economic shock: a demand-side shock (whole populations put into quarantine in every major 
economy, causing a massive reduction of all consumer services), a supply-side shock (the 
measures imposed by governments to contain the spread of the virus caused severe temporary 
supply-side restrictions) and a financial shock (most of the governments and central banks are 
injecting liquidity in the markets, suggesting signs of a liquidity crunch). This three-sides 
economic shock is likely to reduce VCs’ chances to attract syndication partners, raise funds, and 
successfully exit from previous investments in an environment characterized by weakened 
acquisition markets and IPO (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2017; Townsend, 2015). 
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    The aim of this paper is to evaluate how VCs is responding and will respond to Covid-19 
financial crisis, with a focus on the effects this crisis has on VCs’ portfolio allocations. The 
research questions are: Does Covid-19 financial shock affect the financing amount VCs invest in 
startups? Is there a particular sector where VCs are investing in order to alleviate the pandemic 
associated risk? Which are the other main factors that influence VCs investment decisions?  
    The unexpected arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically affected many aspects of 
the global economy, and many economic agents are worried that this shock will drastically reduce 
venture capital flow.   In order to better understand and quantify the impact that the pandemic is 
having and will have on VCs investment model, this paper will statistically analyze the differences 
between the investments made by VCs during the current year with the ones made in the previous 
5 years. Since we are still in the heart of the pandemic is difficult to perfectly forecast how much 
and how VCs investments will be affected by the crisis, therefore the paper will qualitatively 
examine the behavior of VCs during the past recession to better predict the effects of the Covid-
19 crisis on investments. According to W.Gornall (2020), during the first half of 2020, VCs 
investment pace is 71% of their normal activity and is expected to be 81% of their normal pace for 
the rest of the year. As shown by Howell et al. (2020) this pace is similar to the ones of the past 
recessions, although the extent of the fall is expected to be lower than during the dotcom crisis and 
the Great Recession, when investments declined respectively by 50% and 30%.  
    By investigating the repercussions of the pandemic on VCs investment strategy, this paper 
integrates the literature on how the pandemic uncertainty is impacting VCs and startups (Gompers 
et al., 2020) with studies on how the financing environment might influence VC strategies (Kerr 
and Nanda, 2009; Townsend, 2015) and with empirical evidence on the effects that 2008 financial 
crisis had on VCs strategies (A. Conti et al., 2016). In particular, it sheds light on whether the 
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pandemic has affected the financing amount VCs are investing in startups and if there are particular 
sectors in which they are investing in order to alleviate the crisis associated risk.  
    Overall, this paper helps to conclude that VC industry has been more resilient than most of the 
other economic sectors. Although Covid-19 is not yet over, the evidence suggests that the impact 
of the pandemic on VCs has not been significant. These findings represent great news for the 
development of high-growth companies and the whole innovation ecosystem.  
    The empirical analysis is based on data for VCs investments in start‐ups retrieved from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database integrated with a survey of 1,000 VCs on how the pandemic is 
affecting their investments decisions. 
    The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, it reviews the literature on how the 
pandemic uncertainty is impacting VCs and startups merged with the literature on how the 
financing environment affects VCs strategies. In Section 3, it presents the dataset providing 
descriptive statistics of the sample. Section 4 outlines the hypothesis this paper aims to test and 
Section 5 the adopted methodology. Section 6 is dedicated to the presentation of the results and 
comments. Section 7 discusses VC’s perspectives for the future. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
For the topic debated in this paper, several strands of literature, both theoretical researches and 
empirical evidence, are relevant. The literature suggests that, during normal times, there are 
fundamentally three different Venture Capital strategies: Adding value, Sourcing better and 
Investing better. Generally, the best fund pursues all of them (Arnold, 2019). Adding value 
increases the return for VCs on an investment, it is most of the time necessary because the startup 
founders usually need to be coached and helped in some business areas, such as sales, operations, 
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partnership, marketing, recruitment etc. By coaching and monitoring the founders and their teams, 
VC funds help to build the company and create value (Bernstein et al., 2015). Sourcing better 
represents the strategy based on screening, one of the VCs’ main skills. This strategy allows VC 
funds to target exceptional founders and startups, therefore higher expected returns. By using a 
mathematical predictive approach to source better, VCs can proactively build selective and high-
quality networks of startups from which they can choose, fishing in a better pond can make the 
difference (Arnold,2019). Investing better means picking better, having good judgement, 
predicting the future economic trends and innovative technologies. In order to invest better, it is 
essential for VC funds to develop insights and to do researches which will enable them to choose 
and structure safer bets.  
    The previously mentioned VCs strategies are the ones suggested by Paul Arnold founder of 
Switch Ventures, a seed-stage venture capital firm, during normal times. But what if there is a 
global crisis and VCs and startups are facing financing constraints? VCs would base their 
investment decisions on which of the above-mentioned strategies? Would they invest their non-
financial capital more in the screening, the monitoring or the picking of startups? Would startups 
factors, such as number of rounds, funding to date and age at financing, be significant for VCs 
investment decisions?  The literature suggests that startups, since they are young and innovative, 
are usually characterized by unstable cash flows and/or lack of tangible assets, which means high 
volatility, thus high risk (Hall, 2002; O'Sullivan, 2005). These characteristics of startups create 
information asymmetries between VC funds and the firms, thus moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, which in turn generate a mismatch between the supply and demand of finance capital 
for these innovative and risky new ventures (Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Carpenter & 
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Petersen, 2002; Kerr et al., 2011; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Peneder, 2008). In order to reduce this 
risk, VCs tend to invest in projects characterized by a lower volatility of cash flows.  
    If this trend is true during normal times, what happens when the financing environment is 
affected by uncertainties caused by a financial crisis? Would the VCs under financing constraints 
focus their investment on less innovative but less risky startups or they would use more the 
‘investing better’ strategy to find the new unicorns? According to Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2013), the increased uncertainty during financial crises induces VCs to invest in less innovative 
projects. Therefore, financing constraints caused by crises can limit innovation and firm growth, 
although are periods in which innovation should be the key to foster the economic recovery. In 
particular, according to Sørensen (2007), during cold markets experienced VCs can leverage on 
their screening and monitoring skills, which have the tendency to be sector-specific (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2004). Hence, they are likely to focus the available capital in their core sector, deriving 
higher marginal benefits if compared with a diversified portfolio allocation. Less-experienced 
VCs, on the other hand, cannot leverage on their monitoring and screening skills, thus they are 
more likely to hold a diversified portfolio or they can try to find new unicorns by predicting the 
future economic trends and innovative technologies (much riskier). Empirical findings by A. 
Conti, Dass and Graham (2017) confirm that, during the Great Recessions, VC funds made smaller 
and fewer investments reducing their portfolio size. Moreover, their results suggest that 
information problems and financing constraints have driven experienced VCs to allocate their 
capital and non-capital resources to new ventures within their core sectors. These findings are 
particularly true for early stage startups, due to their more accentuated information problems. Less-
experienced VCs, instead, held a diversified portfolio across different sectors. These findings are 
consistent with the above-mentioned literature which emphasizes the difference between 
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experienced VCs and less-experienced ones in addressing asymmetric information problems and 
the disadvantage that the latter have on the former in the screening and monitoring skills.   
    Now that the VCs’ behaviour under financing constraints is better defined, we can focus on the 
aim of this paper: How is COVID-19 impacting VCs investments? Are VC funds changing their 
strategies to address the pandemic? Are there particular ‘safe’ sectors in which they are investing? 
In order to answer these questions, this paper integrates the literature on how the pandemic 
uncertainty is impacting VCs and startups. According to a survey of 1,000 VCs (Gompers et al., 
2020), the impact of the pandemic on the sector will be more moderate than in the dotcom bubble 
of 2001 and the financial crisis of 2007-2009. VC funds expect to have an investments pace of 
81% of their normal pace, nothing compared with the past recessions when investments declined 
by 50% (2001) and 30% (2009). Regarding their portfolio companies, VCs report that 52% of 
them are not affected or positively affected by the pandemic, 38% are negatively influenced and 
10% are in critical condition. Consistent with this, the average fund internal rates of return (IRRs) 
decreased by 1.6% and the average cash-on-cash returns (MOICs) decreased by 0.07 (GGKS, 
2020). The survey shows optimism among VC funds about the performance of their industry, 
indeed 75% of the funds believe that they will outperform public markets. These evidences can be 
explained by four main factors. First, the investment terms are more investor friendly than usual, 
this is possible because the governments are encouraging investments in order to address the 
pandemic crisis. Second, VC-backed companies are usually flexible, thus they are more able to 
pivot to smart working (Ding, Levine, Lin, and Xie, 2020) and they usually have little debt and 
large cash reserves (Papanikolaou and Schmidt, 2020). Third, volatile environments can lead VCs’ 
portfolios to gain value. If the companies within the portfolio are real options on innovative 
technologies, a higher standard deviation may increase the value of those options, which in turn 
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will increase the portfolio’s value (Fluck, Garrison, and Myers, 2006; Peters, 2018). Last, the 
systematic risk of the VC industry is much lower than it was in the past recessions, this is consistent 
with the current better performances of VCs compared to the dotcom crash and the global financial 
crisis.  
 
3. Data  
3.1 Sample construction 
In order to examine VC investment strategies under financing constraints, we focus on the crisis 
caused by the pandemic and draw data on VCs, startups, and financing rounds retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database. To build the sample that I use in my analyses, I employ data 
collected by TRE in November 2020.  
    The analyses begin with a population of 30,253 investments made in the range of year 2015-
2020 (inclusive) by VCs in U.S. startups that are listed in the 2020 TRE database. I retain 16,073 
investments, for which TRE has data on startups founding years, funding rounds, equity amount 
invested, and total funding received by the startups prior to the date of the investment taken into 
account. Choosing this sample period allows me to analyze VCs investment strategies in the years 
before and during the pandemic. Unfortunately, since COVID-19 has not yet run its course, it is 
difficult to evaluate its final impact on VCs’ portfolio performance, but this paper can explain the 
effect that it had after the first year of its establishment.  
    I remove investments made in startups that have corporate venture capital (CVC) as lead 
investors, in order to focus my analysis exclusively on independent VCs strategies. I also exclude 
investments made in startups founded before 2000, because they cannot be considered anymore as 
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“startups”. The final sample includes 12,555 VCs investments made in 9,876 different startups 
over the period 2015Q1-2020Q4. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics  
As shown in Table 1, the startups in the sample are distributed across three main industry classes: 
information technology (68%), medical/health/life-science (22%), non-high technology (10%). 
The average age of these startups, as of 2020, is 7.47 years and 51% of them are located in 
Massachusetts (13%) or California (38%). 16% of the startups in the sample have been financed 
at least once during 2020, year that this paper considers in order to analyze and measure the impact 
of the pandemic crisis on the VC industry.  
Table 1  
Characteristics of sample startups (N=9.876)  
  Mean 
Information Technology 0,68 
Medical/Health/Life Science 0,22 
Non-High Technology 0,10 
Located in California 0,38 
Located in Massachusetts 0,13 
Startup was financed at least once during 2020 0,16 
Startup age, by 2020 7,47 
 
    Table 2 is divided in two different Panels. Panel A shows the characteristics of the total startup 
financing rounds. Panel B, instead, compares the characteristics of startup financing rounds during 
normal times with the ones during COVID-19 crisis. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, the average 
amount per round that the startups in the sample received in the range of years 2015-2020 is $22.18 
million, with a median of $10 million, which means that the distribution in not symmetric and few 
startups received the largest amounts. The averages of the startup age and the number of funds at 
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round r, are respectively 5.8 (years) and 3.95. The startups in the sample raised, on average, $93.91 
million within 3.83 rounds prior to round r. 
Table 2    
Characteristics of startup financing rounds        
Panel A Total rounds (N=12.555) 
  Mean Median  SD 
Round amount in Information Technology 
($m) 
20,52 9,50 47,37 
Round amount in Medical/Health/Life 
Science ($m) 
21,50 12,00 29,82 
Round amount in Non-High Technology ($m) 35,03 10,00 121,12 
Startup age at round r (years) 5,80 3,75 4,32 
No of funds at investment date  3,95 3,00 2,80 
Round amount ($m) 22,18 10,00 56,63 
Cumulative funding prior to round r ($m) 93,91 37,50 291,73 
Number of funding rounds raised at round r  3,83 3,00 3,32 
 
               
Panel B 
Rounds in normal times 
(N=10.538) 
  
Rounds during COVID-19 crisis 
(N=2.017) 
  Mean Median SD   Mean Median SD 
Round amount in Information 
Technology ($m) 
19,30 8,30 46,95   26,67 13,55 49,01 
Round amount in 
Medical/Health/Life Science 
($m) 
20,08 11,00 28,85   29,12 20,00 33,60 
Round amount in Non-High 
Technology ($m) 
30,97 10,00 75,13   60,59 12,00 266,67 
Startup age at round r (years) 5,60 3,58 4,26   6,81 4,75 4,48 
No of funds at investment date  3,89 3,00 2,78   4,23 4,00 2,88 
Round amount ($m) 20,67 9,04 47,62   30,09 14,00 89,68 
Cumulative funding prior to 
round r ($m) 
94,73 37,91 296,39   89,62 34,90 266,09 
Number of funding rounds 
raised at round r 
3,71 3,00 3,28   4,43 3,00 3,49 
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As Panel B of Table 2 reports, the average amount per round that startups received during the 
2020 is $30.09 million compared to $20.67 million during normal times. This means that VCs 
invested, on average, $9.42 million more during the pandemic crisis than in the previous 5 years, 
although, as we will see in Fig.1, the number of deals decreased in 2020, meaning that VCs 
preferred to focus their funds on less but safer projects. This is consistent with a large increase of 
the average amount invested in Non-High Technology startups (almost doubled) and an increase 
of the average startup age at round r (5.6 vs 6.81 years). Nevertheless, if we compare the two years 
before the pandemic outbreak (2018 and 2019) with 2020, we can see that the difference between 
the average amount invested per round is smaller ($28.76 vs $30.09 million). This evidence reveals 
that the results in 2020 are in line with the positive trend showed by this variable over the period 
2015-2019. 
    Fig.1 plots the aggregate amount invested in US startups and the number of deals closed by VCs 
from 2015 to 2020. The graph is based on the data retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database. As mentioned above, both the number of deals and the total amount of funding invested 
decreased in 2020. Indeed, in 2019 the amount of equity invested by US VCs in startups was 
around $74.96 billion with 2,972 closed deals, while in 2020 the dataset records 2,017 deals for a 
total amount invested of $60.69 billion. Nevertheless, the average amount invested per round is 
higher than in 2019 and the total is about 147% of the one recorded in 2017, following an 
increasing trend, as it can be clearly seen from the trendline in the graph. Moreover, the drop in 
the aggregate amount invested has not been dramatic. Indeed, in 2020 US VCs invested around 
80.9% of the funding they invested in 2019, nothing compared with the past recessions, 2001 and 
2009, when investments declined respectively by 50% and 30% (Gompers et al., 2020).  
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Fig. 1. Venture capital investments in US startups, 2015-2020. This figure reports aggregate funding invested in 
US startups and the number of closed deals by VCs, collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. 
 
    Figs.2a and 2b show venture financing by three main industry classes in the US respectively for 
number of closed deals and for amount invested in the period 2015-2020. As we can see, there are 
not wide variations in both the number of closed deals and amount invested across the sectors over 
the period considered, with Information Technology leading, followed by Medical/Health/Life 
Science and Non-High Technology. One fact we can state, is that in 2020, compared to 2019, the 
percentage of the amount invested in Non-High Technology startups increased by 3%, although 
the number of closed deals for the category decreased by 1%. Information Technology startups, 
on the other hand, received (on percentage) less funds than in 2019, but the number of closed deals 
increased by 2%. This might suggest that during times characterized by higher volatility, VCs 
would rather invest more money in less innovative projects or closing more deals, but with smaller 
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Fig.2a Venture financing by sector in the US for number of closed deals, 2015-2020. This graph reports venture 
financing by three main industry classes in the US for number of closed deals collected from the Thomson Reuters 
Eikon database. 
 
Fig.2b Venture financing by sector in the US for amount invested, 2015-2020. This graph reports venture financing 




The empirical analysis is devoted to study the impact of COVID-19 on VCs investments. In 
particular, the analysis aims to test three hypotheses. The first hypothesis tested is whether or not 
the pandemic is affecting the amount per round invested by VCs in US startups. The second 
hypothesis this paper aims to test is whether VCs are investing in safer or in more innovative, but 
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riskier, projects. The last hypothesis examined is whether the pandemic  has a differentiated impact 
in different industries, and if there is a particular industry class in which VCs are investing more 
money than they use to do during normal times. 
    I have no strong ex ante expectations for the effect of the pandemic on the per round amount, 
since, as mentioned in the literature review, the systematic risk of the VC industry is much lower 
than it was in the past recessions and 75% of the funds believe that they will outperform public 
markets (Gompers et al., 2020). For the second hypothesis I expect, from one hand, that VCs have 
invested in safer projects to reduce their risk exposure, from the other hand, that they have 
preferred to invest in more innovative projects which are more able to deal with pandemic 
environment. Lastly, I expect that, during the pandemic, funds have invested more in the High-
Tech and in the healthcare sectors. 
 
5. Methodology  
In order to test the above-mentioned hypothesis, I estimate five different equations, one to study 
the direct impact of the pandemic on the invested funding per round, one to analyze the second 
hypothesis and the other three to examine if each of the three startups industry classes displayed 
in Thomson Reuters Eikon database (Information Technology, Medical/Health/Life Science and 
Non-High Technology) is attracting more or less funds during the crisis.  
    Several possible variables can be used to measure the amount per round, but the most widely 
used, according to A.Conti (2017), are the startup age at financing (Agej,r) and the investment 
round number in which the startup is into (Round_Numberj,r). In order to better measure the 
dependent variable, Round_Amountj,r, my analysis add the following variables (which will be 
 15 
better explained in Table 3): Funding_to_Datej,r, N_Fundsr and a dummy variable named 
Covid_Crisisr. Therefore, Equation (1) is:  
Round_Amountj,r =  +1N_Fundsr + 2Round_Numberj,r + 3Agej,r + 4Funding_to_Datej,r + 
5Covid_Crisisr + j,r 
(1) 
 
    After estimating the baseline effect of the pandemic crisis on the amount that startups raise per 
round, the analysis follows by testing whether or not VCs are investing more funding in safer 
projects. In order to do so, I add to Eq.(1) an interaction between the variable Agej,r  and the dummy 
Covid_Crisisr, because I think that older startups could be considered safer as opposite to the 
younger ones. 
Round_Amountj,r =  +1N_Fundsr + 2Round_Numberj,r + 3Agej,r + 4Funding_to_Datej,r + 
5Covid_Crisisr + 6 Agej,r x Covid_Crisisr + j,r 
(2) 
 
 Lastly, I examine if VCs, during cold markets, tend to invest in sectors characterized by a low 
volatility of cash flows or in innovative sectors trying to predict the future (or current) trends. In 
order to do so, I estimate three different equations which add to Eq. (1) a dummy variable 
representing the startup industry class (Information Technology, Medical/Health/Life Science or 
Non-High Technology) and an interaction between this sector specific variable and Covid_Crisisr. 
By doing so, we can better understand how the startup sector generally affects Round_Amountj,r  
and how it is affecting VCs investments now that we are in the heart of the pandemic. Therefore, 
the models estimated are:  
Round_Amountj,r =  +1N_Fundsr + 2Round_Numberj,r + 3Agej,r + 4Funding_to_Datej,r + 




Round_Amountj,r =  +1N_Fundsr + 2Round_Numberj,r + 3Agej,r + 4Funding_to_Datej,r + 





Round_Amountj,r =  +1N_Fundsr + 2Round_Numberj,r + 3Agej,r + 4Funding_to_Datej,r + 
5Covid_Crisisr +6MHLj,r + 7MHLj,r  x  Covid_Crisisr +  j,r 
(5) 
 
Table 3    Variable definitions 
Name Definition 
Round_Amountj,r  Natural logarithm of the funding amount received by startup j at round r 
N_Fundsr Number of funds participating in round r 
Agej,r Startup j age at round r 
Round_Numberj,r   Investment round number r in which startup j is participating 
Funding_to_Datej,r 
Natural logarithm of the total funding received by startup j from its foundation to 
round r 
Covid_Crisisr 
Dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for innovative start‐up firms,  
and zero otherwise  
ITj,r 
Dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if startup j, that receives funds 
in round r, belongs to Information Technology industry class, and zero otherwise  
NHTj,r 
Dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if startup j, that receives funds 
in round r, belongs to Non-High Technology industry class, and zero otherwise  
MHLj,r  
Dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if startup j, that receives funds 
in round r, belongs to Medical/Health/Life Science industry class, and zero 
otherwise  
 
    The coefficients of particular interest in this paper are the dummy Covid_Crisisr, the interaction 
between the variable Agej,r  and the dummy Covid_Crisisr, the coefficients on the dummies 
representing the different industry classes, and their interaction with the dummy Covid_Crisisr.  
6. Results 
Table 4 reports the results for two different specifications of Equation (1). Column (I) reports the 
results for a basic specification in which startup per round amount depends on the number of funds 
at investment date, the round number, the startup age at financing, the natural logarithm of the total 
funding received by the startup and a dummy indicating whether or not the investment was made 
during the Covid crisis. In column (II) it is included the nonlinear effect of age on the round 
amount.  
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    Table 4 shows that the number of funds participating in an investment round and the total 
funding received by a startup have a positive impact on the round amount. Indeed, if the number 
of funds increases by one, the per round amount increases by 1*𝑒0,1245 and for a 1% increase in 
total funding, it increases by about 0.75%. These findings are consistent with the common logic, 
if there are more investors, the likelihood of raising more funding is higher, and if a startup has 
received more funds in the past, VCs are more likely to invest a higher amount, since it might be 
a signal of the company potential and reliability. The regression finds that age at financing has a 
non-monotonic effect on round amount, in fact older firms receive more, but the opposite happens  
Table 4 presents OLS regression results for the amount of investment funds that a startup raised in a given round. 
Columns I and II report the coefficients for two different specifications of Equation (1). Each observation corresponds 
to a round r raised by a startup j. In columns I are reported the results for the basic Eq.(1), column II includes the 
nonlinear effect of age on the round amount. The definitions of all the variables are provided in Table 3.  The standard 
errors are in parentheses. Significance noted as: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Table 4     
Covid crisis and startup per round amount    
  Startup round amount (log) 
  (I) (II) 
Number of funds 0,1245*** 0,1235*** 
(0,0030) (0,0030) 
Round number -0,0798 -0,0826 
(0,0032) (0,0032) 
Age at financing 0,0374*** 0,1314*** 
(0,0024) (0,0070) 
Age at financing2   -0,0059*** 
  (0,0004) 
Total funding to date (log) 0,7473*** 0,7436*** 
(0,0065) (0,0064) 
Covid Crisis 0,4271 0,4150 
  (0,0219) (0,0218) 
Intercept  2,5163*** 2,3590*** 
  (0,1066) (0,1063) 
      
Multiple R 0,7874 0,7913 
R-squared 0,6201 0,6262 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6199 0,6260 
Standard Error 0,8933 0,8862 
Observations 12555 12555 
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for the oldest. Instead, the number of rounds in which a startup has participated, negatively affect 
the round amount, violating the findings by A.Conti (2017). Last, but not least since is the main 
purpose of Equation (1) and of this paper, we can observe that during the pandemic crisis the per 
round amount is, on average, higher than during normal times (41.5-42.7 percentage points more). 
This evidence provides support to our descriptive statistics findings, and the findings by Venture 
Pulse KPMG (2020), which assert that in 2020 the average amount per round is higher than it was 
in the past years, although the number of deals and the total amount of funding invested decreased. 
Therefore, it can be stated that VC industry is having a resilient behavior. 
    Table 5 shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for two different 
specifications of Equation (2). Column I reports the estimates of the corresponding equation, while 
column II includes the nonlinear effect of age on the round amount. In these regressions the 
coefficients of interest, since we are testing if the age increases during the pandemic, are the ones 
indicating the interaction between the variables Covid_Crisisr  and Agej,r. As can be clearly seen the 
coefficients for this interaction term are both negative, which means that in 2020 older startups 
received, on average, less funding per round. These results can be interpreted by the fact that, 
during the pandemic, VCs have preferred to invest more money for younger new ventures because 
usually they are more adapted to deal with the problems associated with the COVID-19 outbreak. 
Indeed, newer firms are usually more flexible and technologic, and their operations as well, 
therefore by working remotely they can almost maintain their normal rate of productivity. 
Moreover, in the sample are included new established firms in the pharma industry which are 
focused on finding treatments for COVID-19 and developing a vaccine. Clearly, these new 
founded startups have attracted most of the funding, influencing the results of the regression 
considered. 
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Table 5     
Covid crisis and startup per round amount: combined effect of age and pandemic 
  Startup round amount (log) 
  (I) (II) 
Number of funds 0,1240*** 0,1231*** 
(0,0030) (0,0030) 
Round number -0,0808 -0,0832 
(0,0032) (0,0032) 
Age at financing 0,0451*** 0,1301*** 
(0,0025) (0,0070) 
Age at financing2   -0,0054*** 
  (0,0004) 
Covid X Age -0,0431** -0,0327** 
(0,0049) (0,0049) 
Total funding to date (log) 0,7502*** 0,7461*** 
(0,0065) (0,0064) 
Covid Crisis 0,7127 0,6324 
  (0,0390) (0,0393) 
Intercept  2,4279*** 2,3041*** 
  (0,1067) (0,1064) 
      
Multiple R 0,7889 0,7921 
R-squared 0,6224 0,6275 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6222 0,6273 
Standard Error 0,8906 0,8847 
Observations 12555 12555 
Table 5 presents OLS regression results for the amount of investment funds that a startup raised in a given round. 
Columns I and II report the coefficients for two different specifications of Equation (2). Each observation corresponds 
to a round r raised by a startup j. In columns I are reported the results for the basic Eq.(2), column II includes the 
nonlinear effect of age on the round amount. The regressor of interest in this regression is the interaction between the 
variables Covid and Age. The definitions of all the variables are provided in Table 3.  The standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance noted as: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
 In Panel A, B and C of Tables 6, are presented the results from estimating, respectively, Eqs. (3), 
(4) and (5). Panel A reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the natural 
logarithm of the startup round amount including the dummy ITj,r, whereas Panel B and C provide 
the same results including, respectively, the dummies NHTj,r  and MHLj,r. In each panel, column I 
reports the estimates of the corresponding equation, while column II includes the nonlinear effect 
of age on the round amount.  
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    Panel A shows that Information Technology startups receive 1.59% - 3.28% more funds than 
the startups belonging to other industry classes. During the pandemic crisis (2020), IT new 
ventures raised 0.39% - 3.53% more funding than they usually do during normal times. Panel B 
reveals that Non-High Technology firms generally raise 1.65% - 2.23% less per round funding 
than the other startups sectors. The results for this industry class are even worse during the COVID-
19 outbreak, in fact, startups within this sector raised 8.58% - 10.42% less per round funds during 
2020 than in normal periods. Finally, panel C shows that Medical/Health/Life Science startups 
usually receive 0.74% - 3.24% less than the other startups industry classes, but , as it is logical to 
think due to the fact that several new ventures are born with the aim of developing a vaccine, 
during the pandemic they raised 6.32% - 8.50% more than before the spread of COVID-19.  
    As can be clearly seen from Table 6, the impact of the pandemic on the per round funding has 
not been dramatic, with only the Non-High Technology industry class loosing funding per round 
(in percentage). What it might be state, from the evidence of the regression, is that Information 
Technology and Medical/Health/Life Science startups raised more per round funding during the 
COVID-19 outbreak period than in the past 5 years. The explanation for these results is different 
from one industry class to the other. The results for the Information Technology sector might be 
explained by the fact that startups belonging to this industry class are less affected by the pandemic. 
Indeed, for these new firms it is easier to work remotely and to deal with COVID-19 since the 
nature of their operations is already flexible and technologic. Medical/Health/Life Science 
startups, on the other hand, obtained better performance during 2020 due the fact that several 
companies born in this sector have the aim to develop a vaccine or different therapies to heal 
people affected by COVID-19.  
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Table 6     
Covid crisis and startup per round amount: IT versus NHT versus MHL 
Panel A: Information Technology 
Startup round amount (log) 
(I) (II) 
Number of funds 0,1243*** 0,1232*** 
(0,0030) (0,0030) 
Age at financing 0,0376*** 0,1323*** 
  (0,0024) (0,0070) 
Age at financing2   -0,0059*** 
    (0,0004) 
Total funding to date (log) 0,7477*** 0,7443*** 
  (0,0065) (0,0064) 
Covid Crisis 0,4016 0,4108 
  (0,0396) (0,0393) 
Information Technology 0,0159** 0,0328** 
  (0,0189) )0,0188) 
IT X COVID 0,0353* 0,0039* 
  (0,0472) (0,0469) 
Round number -0,0795 -0,0821 
(0,0032) (0,0032) 
Intercept  2,4960*** 2,3211*** 
  (0,1085) (0,1083) 
      
Multiple R 0,7875 0,7914 
R-squared 0,6201 0,6263 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6199 0,6260 
Standard Error 0,8933 0,8861 
Observations 12555 12555 
 
Panel B: Non-High Technology 
Startup round amount (log) 
(I) (II) 
Number of funds 0,1243*** 0,1234*** 
(0,0030) (0,0030) 
Age at financing 0,0374*** 0,1312*** 
  (0,0024) (0,0070) 
Age at financing2   -0,0059*** 
    (0,0004) 
Total funding to date (log) 0,7474*** 0,7437*** 
  (0,0065) (0,0064) 
Covid Crisis 0,4355 0,4219 
  (0,0229) (0,0227) 
Non-High Technology -0,0223** -0,0165** 
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  (0,0287) (0,0285) 
NHT X COVID -0,1042* -0,0858* 
  (0,0769) (0,0763) 
Round number -0,0797 -0,0825 
(0,0032) (0,0032) 
Intercept  2,5154*** 2,3589*** 
  (0,1066) (0,1063) 
      
Multiple R 0,7875 0,7914 
R-squared 0,6202 0,6262 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6200 0,6260 
Standard Error 0,8933 0,8862 
Observations 12555 12555 
 
Panel C: Medical/Health/Life Science 
Startup round amount (log) 
(I) (II) 
Number of funds 0,1244*** 0,1233*** 
(0,0030) (0,0030) 
Age at financing 0,0374*** 0,1324*** 
  (0,0024) (0,0070) 
Age at financing2   -0,0059*** 
    (0,0004) 
Total funding to date (log) 0,7474*** 0,7438*** 
  (0,0065) (0,0064) 
Covid Crisis 0,4263 0,4067 
  (0,0247) (0,0246) 
Medical/Health/Life Science -0,0074** -0,0324** 
  (0,0214) (0,0213) 
MHL X COVID 0,0632* 0,0850* 
  (0,0528) (0,0524) 
Round number -0,0797 -0,0821 
(0,0032) (0,0032) 
Intercept  2,5161*** 2,3588*** 
  (0,1067) (0,1064) 
      
Multiple R 0,7874 0,7913 
R-squared 0,6201 0,6262 
Adjusted R-squared 0,6199 0,6260 
Standard Error 0,8934 0,8862 
Observations 12555 12555 
Table 6 presents OLS regression results for the amount of investment funds that a startup raised in a given round, 
divided by three different industry classes. Panel A focus on Information Technology (Equation (3)), while Panel B 
and Panel C focus on Non-High Technology and Medical/Health/Life Science, respectively (Eqs. (4) and (5)). Each 
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observation corresponds to a round r raised by a startup j. In columns I of each panel are reported the results for the 
basic corresponding equation, column II includes the nonlinear effect of age on the round amount. The definitions of 
all the variables are provided in Table 3. The standard errors are in parentheses. Significance noted as: *p < 0.10; **p 
< 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
7. Limitations and perspectives for the future  
As we have seen in the previous section, the pandemic, against all odds, has positively affected 
the per round amount that startups raised during 2020. In particular, we have seen that 
Medical/Health/Life Science and Information Technology industry classes took advantage from 
the situation since they are more inclined to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak (IT sector) and/or 
gain profit from it (Medical/Health/Life Science sector). Indeed, VCs invested more per round 
funding than usual in new ventures belonging to the above-mentioned industry classes. We have 
also seen with the descriptive statistics of section 3, that the total amount of funding invested by 
VCs in startups in 2020 decreased if compared to 2019, but the number of deals decreased even 
more, increasing the average per deal amount. These results are consistent with the ones obtained 
with the regressions of this paper. By analyzing the data retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database, one can state that the impact of the pandemic on the sector has been more moderate than 
in the dotcom bubble of 2001 and the financial crisis of 2007-2009, as predicted by the survey of 
1,000 VCs mentioned in section 2 (Gompers et al., 2020). Nevertheless, the model of this paper 
has two main limitations. First, it is difficult to predict in only one year the real impact that the 
pandemic will have on the VC industry. Considering the financial crisis (2008) as a benchmark, 
we can state that we will not be able to analyze the final impact of the outbreak on the industry 
until the end of 2021. Indeed, when the financial crisis broke, the VC industry was not affected 
immediately but with a lag of about one year relative to the rest of the financial market (Bernstein 
et al., 2017). Second, the dummy variable Covid_Crisisr  is not statistically significant (p-value > 
0.05) for all the regressions run in this paper. Therefore, there are strong evidences for the null 
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hypothesis, which means that the obtained coefficients of this variable are due to the chance of the 
sample.  
    As previously mentioned, after only one year from the COVID-19 outbreak, we are not able to 
perfectly predict its final impact on the VC industry. However, we can present the perspectives for 
the future of the industry. According to Stanfill, Stanford and Chao (2020), the outlook for the VC 
industry is clearer than in most of the other industries, with two sectors, tech and healthcare, 
receiving more funds during the pandemic than in the past. Moreover, VCs have abundant dry 
powder available to invest in startups and once they will finish their reserves, they will be able to 
raise new funds at historic low interest rates. Lastly, VC industry is living through a period of 
innovation and transformation, accelerated by the pandemic, increasing the access to capital for 
startups. Indeed, VCs are more and more adopting new types of investment vehicles and securities 
which in turn are enabling new ways to capitalize startups. In addition, the use of rolling funds by 
angel investors and the regulatory changes on crowdfunding are opening new sources of capital. 
Stanfill (2020) views all these factors as necessary and positive to foster the expansion of the 
industry. 
    In particular, the healthcare sector prospered in 2020 in terms of VC investments, boosted by 
the biotech and pharma industry which is focused on finding treatments for COVID-19 and 
developing a vaccine. Indeed, biotech and pharma startups received $23.2 billion from VC funds 
across 865 deals in 2020 (Stanford, 2020). Additionally, as opposite to tech companies, working 
remotely is almost impossible for employers in biotech and pharma industry, allowing firms within 
this sector to resume normal productivity sooner than most of the other industries. Therefore, as 
confirmed by the public market sentiment, we can predict that in 2021, and in the foreseeable 
future, this industry will still raise large amount of funding from VC funds.  
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8. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of the pandemic on the Venture Capital industry and, in particular, 
its effect on VCs investment strategies. My paper addresses this question by focusing on three 
hypotheses: whether or not the pandemic is affecting the amount per round invested by VCs in US 
startups, whether VCs are investing in safer or in more innovative, but riskier, projects and whether 
the pandemic  has a differentiated impact in different industries. First, my findings show that in 
2020 the average amount per round raised by startups from VC funds is higher than it was in the 
past years, although the number of deals and the total amount of funding invested decreased. 
Second, they prove that, during the pandemic, VCs have preferred to invest more money for 
younger new ventures because usually they are more adapted to deal with the problems associated 
with the COVID-19 outbreak. Last, they reveal that Information Technology and 
Medical/Health/Life Science startups raised more per round funding during the pandemic period 
than in the past 5 years. Additionally, by examining the findings of Stanfill, Stanford and Chao 
(2020), we can predict that in 2021, and in the foreseeable future, the biotech and pharma industry 
will raise large amount of funding from VC funds. Moreover, we can predict that the VC industry 
will not be affected, from the pandemic, as most of the other industries, due to its flexibility and 
the fact that it is living through a period of innovation and transformation.  
    My findings are not exempt from limitations, therefore they are open to further research. First, 
the lack of viable instruments for the pandemic crisis limits our ability to perfectly predict the final 
impact of COVID-19 on the VC industry. Second, I only evaluate its impact on the per round 
amount, I neither examine the VCs exit strategy, nor their choices regarding their portfolio 
allocation. Last, my evidence regards investments made in US startups, hence one might examine 
VCs investments strategies in startups belonging to different parts of the world.  
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